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Could anything have been done about Dred Scott1 in its own 
day, in a Supreme Court remade by Abraham Lincoln? That is, 
was Dred Scott vulnerable to overrule, even in its own day, even 
in advance of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments? 
Would the power of then-existing constitutional theory have 
been sufficient to support overcoming Dred? If the answer is yes, 
we would have the key to the essential wrongness of Dred Scott, 
quite apart from the usual critiques of Chief Justice Roger 
Taney's opinion. 
Analysis of this question is best performed in a counterfac-
tual setting. By stripping away the aftermath of the election of 
1860, the South's secession and the Civil War, and by examining 
a Lincoln Supreme Court's likely options as rationally perceiv-
able by voters in 1860, we can isolate for consideration the con-
stitutional vulnerabilities of Dred Scott in the context of the na-
tional predicament at the time. We can examine the Court's 
plausible alternatives, with some freedom from involuntary 
anachronism and presentism. 
We can reasonably assume that voters in 1860 were antici-
pating that the South would abide the election and accept Lin-
coln's presidency, in the ordinary peaceable way the Constitu-
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tion provides that Americans undergo a transfer of power. Vot-
ers would anticipate that the South. through the Democratic 
Party. would retain effective control of the Senate after the elec-
tion. as. in fact. it did. Nobody in 1860 could have predicted the 
Confiscation A~ts of 1861 and 1862,c the Emancipation Procla-
mation of 1863,' or the Thirteenth Amendment of 1865.~ So we 
can clear all these events from our thinking and conduct our in-
quiry as if they never occurred. In order to focus more precisely 
on overruling Dred Scott, we will eliminate related possibilities. 
such as the possibility of the Court's sustaining an act of Con-
gress providing for a compensated emancipation. Still. we could 
not advance the inquiry if we took the Court as it was in 1860. 
The "Chase Court," a ten-Justice Court with its full complement 
of five Lincoln appointees, was complete only in 1864, and 
lacked a Lincoln-appointed majority. Let us hypothesize, then, 
for purposes of this analysis, a Chase Court with a majority 
comprised of Lincoln appointees, coming into being early in the 
1860s. and prepared to overrule Dred Scott at the earliest oppor-
tunity. 
What can we gain from setting up this wholly counterfactual 
inquiry. apart from the sheer intellectual fun of it? I have said 
that with this inquiry we will be able to identify and articulate 
the essential constitutional critique of Dred Scott, uncovering, 
among Dred Scott's manifold wrongnesses. its core constitutional 
infirmity. More specifically. we will also discover the true ground 
on which to assess the constitutionality of the Missouri Com-
promise, struck down in Dred Scott-and indeed, all of the old 
territorial "compromise" statutes. We will find that Dred Scott 
was constitutionally infirm within the constitutional understand-
ings of its own time and therefore might have been overruled 
then. The Court arguably could have done this even if an over-
ruling of Dred Scott would have been greeted with the kind of 
disregard we have come to associate with the modern school 
prayer cases, or with Worcester v. Georgia.5 We will also begin to 
2. See Act to Confiscate Property Used for Insurrectionary Purposes, ch. 60, 12 
Stat. 319 § 1 (Aug. 6, 1861) (providing for confiscation of fugitive slaves of rebel owners, 
the slaves to be declared lawful prize in any federal district court sitting in admiralty); An 
Act to Suppress Insurrection, to Punish Treason and Rebellion, to Seize and Confiscate 
the Property of Rebels, and for Other Purposes, ch. 195. 12 Stat. 589, 589-91, §§ 5, 7. 9 
(July 17. 1862) (providing for confiscation of all property of disloyal persons, including 
their slaves. in effect emancipating slaves that ran away to the Union armies). 
3. Proclamation No. 17 (Jan. 1, 1863), republished, 12 Stat. 1268 (1863). 
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (1865) (abolishing slavery in the United States and its 
territories). 
5. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) (removing from state legislative authority the Indian 
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see why the necessary analysis was not evoked, not considered, 
not developed, not argued at the time, even by counsel in Dred 
Scott, even by Dred Scott's dissenting Justices. But we shall also 
see very good reasons for the silence of that generation. Among 
the surprises our exploration has in store for us, we will come to 
see, along with the benefits of overruling Dred Scott, the very 
real difficulties that stood in the way at the time, and the ironies 
that would have accompanied any such overruling. 
II. THE POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF DRED SCOTT 
It is not always understood to what extent Dred Scott was at 
the heart of the election of 1860 and the crisis that followed. In a 
recent symposium on Dred Scott, I argued the centrality of the 
case to those events." In making that claim I did not mean to be 
understood as saying that Dred Scott was the only issue in the 
election of Abraham Lincoln, or, as is often said, that Dred Scott 
caused the Civil War. But it was a central issue in the election, 
and at the eye of the sectional storm as the War came on. 
I need only recount the main lines of that argument here. In 
the 1850s, the sectional conflict over slavery was coming to a 
head. With the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854,7 Congress opened 
the West to slavery, for the first time providing the option of 
slavery to all territories, North as well as South of the old Mis-
souri Compromise line.~ The status of the Western territories-
slave or free- would thenceforth be determined by vote of the 
people of those territories. This was the beguiling theory of so-
called "popular sovereignty." But in the wake of the Kansas-
Nebraska Act, "Bleeding Kansas" became the stage of a verita-
ble rehearsal for the Civil War. And the Whi~ party, the party of 
compromise, collapsed with the North-South coalition that had 
tribes, specifically the Cherokee tribe in Georgia, and placing them under the exclusive 
oversight of the nation). This is the case of which President Jackson is said to have re-
marked, "John Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it." 
6. Louise Weinberg, Dred Scott and the Crisis of 1860, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 97 
(2007). 
7. Act of May 30, 1854, ch. 59, 10 Stat. 277. 
8. Act of Mar. 6, 1820, ch. 22, § 8, 3 Stat. 545. The line was drawn at 36°-30' of lati-
tude. Slavery was prohibited in territory north of the line, except for Missouri. 
9. Throughout this paper, for convenience I sometimes ignore distinctions not im-
portant to my argument among and within sections of the country. I use such customary 
terms as "the South," and "Southerners" to refer to white leaders, thinkers, or prevailing 
white opinion in slave states. "The North" generally means "not the South," and in-
cludes, e.g .. the old Northwest Territory, the northerly sections of the old Louisiana Ter-
ritory, and the Far West. 
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sustained it. On both sides, increasing anger and extremism in 
politics was exceeded only by the anger and extremism of the 
press. 
Historians generally agree that this conflict was not about 
slavery simply, or about slavery in the South. but about slavery 
in the territories. It is also understood that the dispute was not 
about competing labor systems for the territories. but rather was 
a scramble for territory itself. Moreover. the scramble for terri-
tory was not a struggle for land, but rather for national political 
power.10 In my earlier paper I traced the economic. political, and 
social roots of this power struggle. 
In 1857, in Dred Scott, through a reactionary blunder of 
monstrous proportions, the Taney Court attempted to put an 
end to the conflict by coming down squarely on one side, endow-
ing slave-owners with a fundamental constitutional right of prop-
erty in their slaves. The Court held that Congress could not es-
tablish free territory, since to do so would destroy the property 
rights of slave-owners traveling or settling there. 
Chief Justice Taney found these substantive property 
rights in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 11 This 
sacralization of slave property, depending as it did on the Con-
stitution, necessarily stripped Congress of authority to reach a 
fresh political compromise of the issue tearing the country apart. 
With Dred Scott, Congress lost its power of abolition. Yet the 
Union had been able to survive until then largely because Con-
gress could prohibit slavery in some territories as the price of 
permitting slavery in others. James Madison thought that no 
blame should attach to Congress in seeking to avoid disunion by 
this means. 12 This sort of compromise had characterized the 
whole course of legislation governing the territories from which 
new states would be added to the Union. This was the bargain 
struck over and over, from the Northwest Ordinance of 1787.1' 
10. This was understood at the time. See. e.g .. the respected Irish economist. JOHN 
E. CAIRNES. THE SLA YE POWER: ITS CHARACfER. CAREER. AND PROBABLE DESIGNS 
(2003) ( 1863). at 104 ("The desire to obtain fresh territory for the creation of slave states. 
with a view to influence in the Senate. has carried the South in its career of aggression far 
beyond the range which its mere industrial necessities would have prescribed."). 
11. Dred Scott. 60 U.S. at 450; U.S. CONST. amend. V (1791) ("No person shall ... 
be deprived of life. liberty. or property. without due process of law: nor shall private 
property be taken for public use. without just compensation."). 
12. Letter from James Madison to Robert Walsh (NO\. 20. 1819). in IX THE 
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON (Gaillard Hunted .. 1910). at 1: Letter from James Madi-
son to James Monroe (Feb. 23. 1820). ibid .. at 23. 
13. Act of Julv 13. 1787. An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the 
United States. Norih-West of the River Ohio. ch. 8. I Stat. 50. 51 (abolishing slavery in 
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and the Missouri Compromise of 1820,14 through the Compro-
mise of 1850,15 to the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854.1" In declar-
ing the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional, 17 however, Dred 
Scott, in effect, rendered all these old compromises unconstitu-
tional. Congress could only permit slavery, never prohibit it. 1 ~ 
With an obtuseness that still baffles the reader, the Dred Scott 
Court thought to pacify the South by denying Congress power to 
pacify the rest of the country. The Court imagined it could con-
tain the conflict by denying Congress the power to contain it. 
Let me pause briefly to acknowledge that a purist reader 
might characterize the Court's ruling on the limits of the power 
of Congress under the Fifth Amendment as mere obiter dictum, 
casually offered only in passing. 1y In this view, Dred Scott simply 
held that there could be no federal diversity jurisdiction in the 
case, Scott being black, and therefore, according to Chief Justice 
Taney, incapable of citizenship. But to suppose that Dred Scott 
was about jurisdiction would be about as helpful as supposing 
that Marbury v. Madison was about jurisdiction. co The issue roil-
the old Northwest Territory: tacitly isolating slavery in the South). 
14. Act of Mar. 6. 1820. ch. 22. § 8. 3 Stat. 545 (dealing with the Louisiana Purchase: 
closing to slavery territory north of 36c -30' of latitude. except for Missouri: opening to 
slavery Missouri and territory to the south of the Compromise line). 
15. Act of Sept. 9. 1850. ch. 49. 9 Stat. 446: Act of Sept. 9. 1850. ch. 51. 9 Stat. 453. 
The Compromise of 1850 brought California into the Union directly as a free state with-
out regard to the Compromise line. but opened the New Mexico and Utah territories to 
the option of slavery. Later. as part of the Compromise. Congress also enacted a new. 
more draconian fugitive slave law. Act of Sept. 18. 1850. ch. 60. 9 Stat. 462 (amending the 
Fugitive Slave Act of 1793), repealed. Act of June 28. 1864. ch. 166. 13 Stat. 200. As part 
of the Compromise of 1850. Congress also prohibited the slave trade in the District of 
Columbia. Act of Sept. 20. 1850. ch. 63. 9 Stat. 467. 
16. Act of May 30. 1854. ch. 59. 10 Stat. 277. With the Kansas-Nebraska Act. Con-
gress abandoned responsibility for determining the status. slave or free. of the remaining 
territories. relegating that responsibility instead to the affected populations. 
17. The Missouri Compromise line had been repealed. in effect. by the Kansas-
Nebraska Act's provision of so-called "popular sovereignty." What the Dred Scott Court 
struck down was the Missouri Compromise as it stood at the time of Scott's sojourn on 
free territory. 
18. Even the Kansas-Nebraska Act's expedient of "popular sovereignty" was spe-
cifically ruled unconstitutional in Dred Scott: "And if Congress itself cannot do this-if it 
is beyond the powers conferred on the Federal Government-it will be admitted. we pre-
sume. that it could not authorize a Territorial Government to exercise them." Dred Scott, 
60 U.S. at 451. 
19. This is a commonplace view. Commentators point out that Chief Justice Tanev 
devoted too little space to the due process argument to justify a reading of the case be·-
yond its jurisdictional holding. See, e.g .. DON E. FEHRENBACHER. THE DRED SCO'IT 
CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS (1978). at 352: James W. Elv. 
Jr .. The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in the Origins of Substantive D1;e 
Process, 16 CONST. C0~1MENT. 315. 3JS (1999). 
20. Cf. Louise Weinberg. Our Marbury. 89 VA. L. REV. 1235. 1296. 1341 (2003). 
The jurisdictional ruling in Dred Scali was all nonsense. of course. Chief Justice Taney 
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ing the country, which the Court had undertaken to settle, was 
not about the availability of federal courts to black persons, but 
was about the extension of slavery into the remaining territories 
of the United States. 
Of course, Dred Scott was deeply satisfying to Southerners. 
After Dred Scott, neither Congress nor its delegate, a territorial 
legislature, could constitutionally prohibit slavery in the particu-
lar territory.'1 And, just as the Fifth Amendment protected slave 
property from deprivation by Congress, it might even protect 
slave property from deprivation by a state, notwithstanding the 
Fifth Amendment's inapplicability to the states. The original 
thirteen colonies came into being as "states" when the nation 
did. in 1776. But the newer states were creatures of Congress, as 
were the territories from which they emerged, and thus might be 
held to be Congress's delegates too. Abraham Lincoln feared 
that with just one more case the Court would strip the states of 
power to abolish slavery within their own borders.'2 True, this 
last possibility was unlikely. The states created by Congress gen-
erally were assumed, under the applicable statutes, to enjoy 
"equal footing" with the original thirteen states,2' and therefore 
to have the same power to opt for or against slavery, once state-
hood was achieved, as the original thirteen possessed. And the 
Fifth Amendment, as interpreted in Dred Scott, would obviously 
protect slave property from deprivation by Congress in a state as 
well as in a territory, whether that state were one of the original 
thirteen or not. 
The trouble, to Southern leaders, was that Dred Scott ap-
peared to be threatened. Not by constitutional amendment-the 
South was protected against constitutional amendments. With 
equal representation in the Senate, Southern states could always 
seemed to read the statutory grant of diversity jurisdiction as if it required federal rather 
than state citizenship, compounding confusion by ruling that federal citizenship was a 
condition of access to federal courts. But there are no prominent heads of federal juris· 
diction that require U.S. citizenship. Perhaps to overcome this objection, Taney argued 
that access to federal courts was a "privilege or immunity" of national citizenship. But at 
the time the only privileges and immunities in the Constitution were privileges of state, 
not national, citizenship. U.S. CONST. art IV, §1. 
21. For Taney's language, see supra note 18, Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 451. 
22. Abraham Lincoln, Speech Delivered at Springfield, Illinois ("A House Di-
vided"] (Jun. 16, 1858), in ABRAHAM LINCOLN, COMPLETE WORKS (in two volumes) 
(John G. Nicolay & John Hay eds., 1902) (1894), vol. I, at 241, 244 ("Put this and that 
together, and we have another nice little niche, which we may, ere long, see filled with 
another Supreme Court decision declaring that the Constitution of the United States 
does not permit a State to exclude slavery from its limits."). 
23. See, e.g., Missouri Compromise of 1820, § 1 (Missouri Enabling Acts) (Mar. 6, 
1820). ch. 22, 3 Stat. 545 (providing for "equal footing" for the new state of Missouri). 
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block a constitutional amendment: the supermajorities required 
for constitutional amendments by Article V could be achieved 
by no anti-South coalition. Even after the election of 1860, the 
Democrats, who had lost the House of Representatives in 1858, 
still retained control of the Senate in the lame-duck 36th Con-
gress,2~ as it almost always had since 1789. And the South "had'' 
the Supreme Court. 
But Southerners feared devastating developments from an-
other source. During the celebrated 1858 debates between Lin-
coln and Stephen A. Douglas. when the two were contending for 
a seat in the Senate, Douglas made a remark at Freeport, Illi-
nois,2' a remark that was undermining Southern confidence in 
Dred Scott. Building on the much-quoted language in Somerset's 
Case. in which Lord Mansfield had declared, "Slavery is so odi-
ous that nothing can support it but positive law, "2" Douglas took 
the position that a territory could defeat Dred Scott simply by 
failing to enact law creating, supporting. and enforcing rights of 
property in slaves.2' 
24. In the Senate. in the lame-duck 36th Congress. 2d Session. after the admission 
of Kansas as the 34th state on January 29. 1861. 68 seats were available. The Democrats 
had 38 of these. (The Republicans had 26. the American Party two. and the two Kansas 
seats were not yet filled.) The Democrats might have retained control even of the post-
secession Senate in the 37th Congress. had their Senators remained in Washington in 
sufficient numbers to defeat the admission of Kansas in the previous Congress. In the 
Senate in the 37th Congress. first convened July 4. 1861. there were 31 Republicans (in-
cluding the two from Kansas) plus three Unionists: the remaining 34 seats were held by 
Democrats or were vacant. the vacancies in seats abandoned by Southerners. In the 
House. in the lame duck 36th Congress. 2d Session. the Democrats, having lost control in 
1858. could outvote the Republicans only if they could achieve coalition with other non-
Republican parties. (The house had 116 Republicans, and 122 in all other parties.) Here. 
the South's absence during the vote to admit Kansas did not clearly hurt the South: Kan-
sas was admitted with only one representative. In the 37th Congress, the Republicans 
were a plurality in the House, but in coalition with the Unionists had a clear majority. 
The House was still apportioned under the old census of 1850, and 239 seats were avail-
able. Republicans and Unionists of various factions held 140 seats, leaving only 99 for all 
other parties. KENNETH C. MARTIS, HISTORICAL ATLAS OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE 
UNITED STATES CONGRESS (1989); KENNETH C. MARTIS, HISTORICAL ATLAS OF 
U:\ITED STATES CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS (1982). For recent discussion of the chang-
ing composition of Congress as secessionists cleared out, and the resultant strains on 
Congress. see John Bryan Williams, How to Survive a Terrorist Attack: The Constitution's 
Majority Quorum Requirement and the Continuity of Congress, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1025 (2006). See, for the work and radicalization of the 37th Congress in the absence of 
Southern members. David P. Currie, The Civil War Congress, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1131 
(2006). 
25. Stephen A. Douglas. Reply to Lincoln in the Freeport Debate (Aug. 27, 1858), 
in THE COMPLETE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES OF 1858 (Paul M. Angle ed., 1991) 
(1958), at 152 ("[S]lavery cannot exist a day or an hour anywhere. unless it is supported 
by local police regulations ... "). 
26. Somerset v. Stewart, 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (KB 1772). 
27. Douglas, Reply to Lincoln. supra note 25. 
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Southern leaders were determined to shore up Dred Scott 
against Douglas's "Freeport Doctrine," and to extend more ex-
plicitly the protection of Dred Scott over the entire nation as well 
as the territories. At the convention of the Democratic party in 
Charleston in 1860, Southern "Fire-Eaters" confrontationally 
called for a plank in the party platform demanding that Congress 
enact a nationwide slave code.28 The convention's rejection of 
this extremist demand broke up the fragile old North-South 
Democratic coalition on the spot. Delegates from eight Southern 
states bolted the convention. This split in the Democratic Party, 
perversely. made a Republican victory in 1860 almost inevita-
ble.'y 
Southerners also feared a more direct challenge to Dred 
Scott. If Abraham Lincoln, the candidate of the new Republican 
Party, won the forthcoming election, he might well be able to 
transform the Supreme Court, and get Dred Scott overruled. Af-
ter all, Andrew Jackson, that hero of the South, had transformed 
the Court. Jackson had nominated five Justices, including Chief 
Justice Roger Taney,30 and three of them were still serving on 
the Court that decided Dred Scott.' 1 To be sure, a Jackson ap-
pointee, Justice McLean, dissented in Dred Scott. Nevertheless, 
it was felt that Jackson had succeeded in completing the anti-
Federalist work of his predecessors, and had created the Taney 
Court. With Dred Scott, the South-leaning, pro-slavery propensi-
ties of the Taney Court were only just becoming fully apparent. 
Now this new man, Abraham Lincoln, this dark-horse presiden-
tial candidate, this "black Republican,'' was adamantly opposing 
28. This faction achieved its aims in the platform produced at the June 11. 1860. 
convention of the Democratic Party's Deep South [Breckinridge] faction in Richmond. 
Va. See NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS 1840-1968 (Kirk H. Porter & Donald B. John-
son. eds. 1972). at 31. paras. 2. 3. 
29. For a chronology of the events leading to what became a three-way split in the 
Democratic Partv in 1860. see Weinberg. Dred Scott. supra note 6, at 122-33. 
30. In 1833. in his notorious war on the Bank of the United States. Jackson ap-
pointed Roger Taney. at the time his Attorney General. as Secretary of the Treasury to 
replace Secretary William J. Duane. who replaced Secretary Louis McLane. neither of 
whom would carry out Jackson's imbecile order to remove the federal deposits from the 
Bank. Alone in Jackson's cabinet. only Taney was willing to carry out the order. Jack-
son's attempt to reward Taney with an Associate Justiceship on the Supreme Court was 
rebuffed by an outraged Senate. but after the death of John Marshall and a Democratic 
Party sweep in the election of 1836. Jackson, though a lame duck. was able to put Taney 
into the Chief Justiceship. See ROBERT V. REMJNI. ANDREW JACKSON AND THE BANK 
WAR ( 1967). For a contemporaneous account. see T. F. GORDON. THE WAR ON THE 
BA:-;KOFTHE UNJTEDSTATES(1834). 
31. Still serving in 1857 were Chief Justice Roger Taney and Justices John McLean 
and James M. Wayne. Jackson's other appointees. Justices Henry Baldwin and PhilipP. 
Barbour. died in the 18-IOs. 
2007] OVERCOMING DRED 741 
the further territorial spread of slavery, and inveighing against 
Dred Scott at every opportunity. 
Lincoln was outraged by Dred Scott. In his bid for the Sen-
ate, in his celebrated debates with Stephen A. Douglas, Lincoln 
must have seemed to be running not so much against Douglas as 
against Dred Scott. 32 His attacks on the case continued after his 
loss to Douglas. Lincoln attacked Dred Scott in his great speech 
at Cooper Union." As presidential candidate he was still running 
against Dred Scott; Lincoln ran on a Republican Party platform 
opposing Dred Scott in not one, but four planks.34 He was still at-
tacking the case after the election, insisting in his First Inaugural 
Address that Dred Scott was only an ordinary litigation between 
private parties, and that, although binding between the parties, 
the Supreme Court's judgment in a private dispute should not be 
allowed to set national policy- that no public official should feel 
bound by such a judgment.'' It was, precisely, to oppose the 
spread of slavery into the more northerly territories, a possibility 
opened up for the first time in the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854, 
that Lincoln had come out of political retirement. It was in the 
same interest that Lincoln's party-the new Republican Party-
had come together."' Southerners could reasonably fear the kind 
of Supreme Court Justices such a President would appoint. As 
Stephen A. Douglas argued, "Mr. Lincoln intimates that there is 
another mode by which he can reverse the Dred Scott decision. 
How is that? Why, he is going to appeal to the people to elect a 
President who will appoint judges who will reverse the Dred 
Scott decision."17 
32. See COMPLETE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES. supra note 25. at 4-7.28-29.36-
37.70.77-79.120.128-29.217-18.309-11.333.335.337-38.394. 
33. See Lincoln. Address at Cooper Institute. New York (Feb. 20. 1860). in I 
COMPLETE WORKS. supra note 22. at 599. 600-07. 
34. See Republican Platform of 1860. para. 2. in NATIO~AL PARTY PLATFORMS. 
supra note 28. at 32 (calling attention to the language of the Declaration of Independ-
ence that '"all men are created equal""): para. 5 (deploring ··the intervention of Congress 
and of the Federal Courts of the extreme pretensions of a purely local interest .... "): 
para. 7 (denouncing '"the new dogma that the Constitution ... carries slavery into any or 
all of the territories of the United States" as ··a dangerous political heresy"): para. 8 (de-
claring the determination of Republicans to oppose the Taney Court's interpretation of 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment). 
35. Lincoln. First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4. 1861 ). in II Cm.IPLETE WORKS. supra 
note 22. at 5. 
36. In the election of 1856. the Republican party fielded its first presidential the 
election of 1856. candidate. John C. Fremont of California. a soldier. inventor. explorer. 
and a bit of a character. The party slogan was ··Free soil. free men. Fremont." 
37. Stephen A. Douglas. Speech at Springfield. Illinois (July 17. 1858). in 
COMPLETE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES. supra note 25. at 43. 57: cf Abraham Lin-
coln. Speech in Reply to Senator Douglas. delivered at Chicago (July 10. 1858). in I 
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The election of 1860, then, was to some extent a referendum 
on Dred Scott. It is tempting to liken the case to Roe v. Wade in 
our own time. But Dred Scott was about deep power politics, and 
the controversy with which it dealt divided the country geo-
graphically. Polarizing as Roe has seemed, it will not lead to war 
between the states. 
On the other hand, we need to remember that an overruling 
of Dred Scott would not resolve the sectional conflict. Depend-
ing on the ground of decision. an overruling of Dred Scott might 
permit courts to apply a rule of liberty once more to so-called 
"sojourners'' -slaves that had been taken voluntarily into free 
territory and had sojourned there for a time.1H However, the evi-
dence of the Dred Scott controversy itself is that few Southern 
courts might remain willing to avail themselves of the opportu-
nity,19 and the question arose infrequently in Northern courts. At 
best, depending on the ground of decision, an overruling of Dred 
Scott might restore power to Congress to try to reach some new 
political "compromise" between North and South on the burn-
ing issue of slavery in the territories. Yet it seems unlikely that 
any fresh compromise could be had. The chance of compromise 
was over by the time of the election of 1860, although some who 
understood the seriousness of the crisis but failed to understand 
the futility of the effort still struggled to find some modus 
vivendi. With Southern Democrats demanding national legal 
protection for slavery,-!(' and the Republicans opposing the exten-
sion of slavery into the territories under anx circumstances, the 
conflict had indeed become "irrepressible," 1 or, more precisely, 
irreconcilable. All last-minute efforts at compromise were fail-
C0\1PLETE WORKS. supra note 22. at 247. 
3H. See infra note 69 and accompanying text. 
39. See Scott v. Emerson. 15 Mo. 576 (1852) (in earlier litigation by Scott in the 
Missouri state courts. reversing the judgment of the trial court. which had followed the 
rule of liberty. "once free. always free" -the rule until then applied in Missouri and other 
Southern states: declaring that Missouri would no longer extend comity to the laws of 
free states or territories): cf. Dred Scoll. 60 U.S. at 560-61 (McLean. J.. dissenting) (refer-
ring to the rule "once free. and always free" as a rule in the courts of Maryland. a border 
slave state. while erroneously supposing that the rule of liberty was the law in no South-
ern court). 
40. See Democratic Platform (Breckinridge Faction]. para. 2. in NATIONAL PARTY 
PLATFORMS. supra note 28. at 31 ("[I]t is the duty of the Federal Government. in all its 
departments. to protect. when necessary. the rights of persons and property in the Terri-
tories. and wherever else its constitutional authority extends."). 
41. William Henry Seward. Speech. The Irrepressible Conflict (Oct. 25. 1858). in IV 
THE WORKS OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 1853-84 (George E. Baker ed .. 1855). at 289. 292. 
echoing Lincoln in his ··A House Divided" speech. in I COMPLETE WORKS. supra note 
22. at 240. 
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ing. "Entertain no proposition for a compromise," Lincoln ad-
monished a Republican member of Congress. "in regard to the 
extension of slavery. The instant you do, they have us under 
again; all our labor is lost, and sooner or later must be done 
over. ... The tug has to come and better now than later. "42 
Southerners not given to complex constitutional analysis 
might well have feared an overruling of Dred Scott should Lin-
coln win, whatever difficulties in accomplishing an overruling 
our own analysis will reveal. The fear would have been real 
enough. Had the South remained in the Union to witness an 
overruling of Dred Scott, the balm administered to Southerners 
by Dred Scott- the moral force of constitutional protection-
would have been scrubbed away. The acute wounds of moral 
opprobrium inevitably would have become much harder for 
Southerners to bear. Congress's power over the status of the ter-
ritories would be restored, whether or not Congress chose to ex-
ercise it. Worst of all, Southerners would have believed that, 
stripped of power to groom enough new slave states for admis-
sion to the Union, the South would be left without sufficient 
strength to extricate itself from its continuing loss of political 
muscle in Congress. This, with the fact of a Lincoln victory itself, 
would have suggested to Southern leaders a permanent loss of 
the presidency; more, it would have meant to them the end of 
the Southern ascendancy-an invitation to secede from the Un-
ion. 
III. NARROWING THE QUESTION 
As it fell out, Lincoln was never able to create a Supreme 
Court majority, despite the ten-Justice Court afforded him by 
Congress. All together he had the naming of four Associate Jus-
ticeS,43 and, eventually, a new Chief Justice, his Secretary of the 
Treasury, Samuel P. Chase. With the war going badly and his 
administration under fire, Lincoln chose Associate Justices who 
were moderately conservative Union men-including the De-
mocrat, Stephen J. Field- not at all the extremists the South had 
feared. But in advance of the election these moderate appoint-
ments could not have been predicted. 
42. Reply to a Letter from William Kellogg. M.C.. Asking Advice (Dec. 11. 1860). 
in I COMPLETE WORKS. supra note 22. at 658. 
43. Lincoln named Associate Justices Noah H. Swavne. Samuel F. Miller. David 
Davis. and. to fill the new tenth seat Congress gave him. Stephen J. Field. a Democrat. 
All were strong Unionists. 
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In advance of the election, what might pro-slavery voters 
fear. and anti-slavery voters hope, that a Lincoln Supreme Court 
would do about Dred Scott? What were the general understand-
ings at the time? Even if voters could anticipate that Lincoln's 
Supreme Court would build its jurisprudence conservatively on 
the jurisprudence of its predecessors, as indeed it did, 44 they 
could hardly assume that, if given an opportunity to narrow or 
overrule Dred Scott, Justices selected by Abraham Lincoln 
would decline the chance. What were the options open to a fu-
ture Supreme Court fashioned by Abraham Lincoln? 
A Lincoln Court might be expected to confront. if not slav-
ery, then at least the Dred Scott case, and to overrule it. The 
Court might be faced with a case, for example, brought on behalf 
of a slave taken voluntarily into territory free under one of the 
old compromises, and, on her return to the South, suing for 
freedom in the courts of the domiciliary state, relying on the act 
of Congress effecting the relevant compromise-thus directly 
challenging Dred Scott. The Supreme Court would have jurisdic-
tion to review the judgment below on writ of error, since, which-
ever way the judgment went in the court below, the petitioner 
challenging that judgment would be relying on federallaW40 -the 
plaintiff below on the act of Congress, the defendant on the Fifth 
Amendment. 
But on what rationale could the Court overrule Dred Scott? 
We can say unequivocally at the outset that in the 1860s, in a 
case overruling Dred Scott, our hypothetical Supreme Court 
would have to confront the Fifth Amendment holding at the 
heart of Dred Scott. That is because the Fifth Amendment would 
continue to stand in the way of congressional power revived on 
any other ground. For this reason, such features of the case as, 
for example, Chief Justice Taney's racism, can furnish only but-
tressing arguments. Such arguments can address Dred Scott's 
holdings on jurisdiction and citizenship. But they cannot address 
the key sectional dispute over the territorial extension of slavery 
and over the power of Congress to deal with it. 
The Fifth Amendment, then, would have to be reinter-
preted. But an acute problem presents itself immediately. Any 
such shattering of Dred Scott's protection for slavery would not 
only stifle the South's hopes for new slave territory, but also re-
44. See e.g .. Mark Graber. The Jacksonian Origins of Chase Court Activism. 1 J. S. 
CT. HIST. 17 (2000) (with statistics). 
45. First Judiciary Act of 1789. § 25. 1 Stat 73. 
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store the old feared inchoate power of Congress or the courts to 
abolish slavery in the nation some day. Would not the overrule 
of Dred Scott trigger the very secession that, in our hypotheticaL 
has not occurred, with the same danger that the border states 
would go as well? We cannot proceed to our inquiry if this seri-
ous political consideration bars the way at the outset. And so we 
must assume that our hypothetical Supreme Court would not let 
this political consideration stand in its way, any more than con-
sideration of serious political consequences stood in the Court's 
way in deciding Dred Scott. 
We can proceed then to the possibility of the Court's over-
ruling Dred Scott with a reinterpretation of the Fifth Amend-
ment. But on what theory? It is a most interesting inquiry. No 
constitutional theory seemed to present itself in the antebellum 
period. I offer a theory shortly,"" one apparently glimpsed at the 
time and even asserted with some frequency, but-for under-
standable reasons-not put forward in any fully developed way. 
In thinking about the possible options available to a hypo-
thetical Lincoln Court in dealing with Dred Scott, there seem to 
be three possibilities worth discussing. 
IV. ONE THEORY: "SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS" 
When critics of Dred Scott concern themselves with the 
Fifth Amendment issue, at least ever since Edward Corwin's 
progressive-era critique of the case,47 they tend to focus on Dred 
Scott's "'substantive due process" reasoning, either to deplore or 
defend it on abstract theoretical grounds, sometimes concealing 
a political intention."' In theory, our hypothetical Supreme Court 
in the 1860s might take the path of reinterpreting the Due Proc-
ess Clause as purely procedural-as incapable of vindicating 
substantive rights. 
I would suggest that there are two main understandings of 
"'substantive due process" today, as I glean them from tradition, 
cases, and commentary. The first understanding is that a law vio-
46. See infra Part VI. 
47. Edward S. Corwin. The Dred Scort Decision in Light of Conremporary Legal 
Doctrines, 17 AM. H!ST. REV. 52. 53-59 ( !911 ). 
4K See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson. Thirteen Ways of Looking at Dred 
Scott. ll2 CH!.-KE!':T L. REV. 49. 73-76 (2007) (arguing that Roger Taney's substantive 
due process was both traditional and. as applied. wrong): Paul Finkelman. Scott v. Sand-
ford: The Court's Most Dreadfid Case and How It Changed History. 82 CHI.-KENT L. 
RE\'. 3. 10-11 (2007) (arguing that in view of valued unenumerated rights emerging in the 
wake of Lochner. criticism of Dred Scott's substantive due process is wearing thin). 
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lates the Due Process Clause of either the Fifth or Fourteenth 
Amendments when it trenches on a "fundamental right" -that 
is. a right enumerated in the Bill of Rights, or an unenumerated 
right so important that no amount of notice or hearing, post-
deprivation or pre-deprivation, can insulate the violation from 
strict judicial review. The second substantive due process theory 
posits that a law allegedly injurious to the interests of the plain-
tiff may be so arbitrary, irrational, confiscatory, or discrimina-
tory as not to be law at all- not law that can be applied as the 
process that is due.4~ This entitles the plaintiff to meaningful judi-
cial review. In this latter understanding, I would suggest that 
substance is transformed into procedure. In such cases, law is 
deemed so unreasonable as to be unworthy of application within 
the adjudicatory process. Fairness in adjudication requires rea-
sonable law. The thinking is that reasonable law is part of the 
process that is due. 
It is not clear to me which of these two approaches was 
Chief Justice Taney's in Dred Scott. On the one hand, he was 
concerned with vested rights in property. On the other, he was 
concerned with an arbitrary and discriminatory confiscation: 
And an act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United 
States of his liberty or property, merely because he came him-
self or brought his property into a particular Territory of the 
United States, and who had committed no offence against the 
laws, could hardly be dignified with the name of due process 
of law.50 
Critics of substantive due process insist, reasonably if literal-
istically, that process refers to procedure, not substance. They 
therefore regard substantive due process as an oxymoron in any 
context. They have not considered the above-described interest-
ing phenomenon of substance transformed into procedure. 
As for the "'fundamental rights" strand of substantive due 
process, critics of the concept tend to argue, apparently to satisfy 
personal political preferences, that substantive due process is ju-
dicial lawmaking at its most activist, allowing an uncontrollable 
judiciary to create rights where the Constitution does not. This 
49. For the closely related argument that due process is a limit on law chosen 
through a method disregardful of the content and policy of the chosen law, see Louise 
Weinberg. Theory Wars in the Conflict of Laws. 103 MICH. L. REV. 1631. 1634-70 (2005); 
Louise Weinberg. Back to the Future: The New General Common Law. in Symposium. 35 
J. MAR. L. & COMM. 523 (2004): Louise Weinberg. Choice of Law and Minimal Scrutiny. 
49 U. CHI. L. REV. 440-88 (1982). 
50. Dred Scott. 60 U.S. at 450. 
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fretting over new rights puts the critics of substantive due proc-
ess in the uncomfortable, indeed un-American, position of insist-
ing that the Bill of Rights places a ceiling upon, rather than a 
floor beneath, constitutional rights. Their view is contrary to 
James Madison's view, and contrary to the explicit rule of con-
struction given in the Ninth Amendment, that the enumeration 
of rights is not to be read as an exclusion of unenumerated 
rights. This consideration might create a difficulty for a Court 
seeking to overrule Dred Scott in reaction to its substantive due 
process reasoning. 
Even if objections to unenumerated rights were consonant 
with basic constitutional understandings, such objections would 
suffer from their concentration in twentieth century controver-
sies. The whole line of argument gives off too potent a whiff of 
the struggles of the century just past to permit its confident pro-
jection onto the jurisprudence of the antebellum period.' 1 As 
everybody knows, in the last quarter of the twentieth century 
"substantive due process" was the bugaboo of social conserva-
tives outraged by Roe v. Wade." They liked to tar Roe with the 
Dred Scott brush. In the previous wave of such criticisms, in the 
1930s, substantive due process was the whipping-boy of the left. 
The unacceptable case in those pre-Roe days was Lochner,'' the 
bad old case stripping the states of power, under the Due Proc-
ess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to improve the condi-
tions of labor. Today's conservatives often liken Roe to Lochner 
as well as to Dred, to demonstrate the awfulness of Roe.54 In 
view of the fount of rights that Lochner was to become, today's 
liberals are increasingly rallying to Lochner's defense." 
51. Cf James Ely, The Oxymoron Reconsidered, supra note 19. at 319 (arguing that 
substantive due process was not distinguished from procedural due process in the ante-
bellum period and that to criticize antebellum substantive due process on grounds found 
today would be anachronistic). 
52. 410 U.S. 959 (1973) (finding a constitutional right to abortion in the first trimes-
ter of pregnancy. and a modified such right in the second). Women's abortion rights and 
government powers over them have evolved since Roe and are subject to a different 
analysis. See Gonzales v. Carhart. 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007): Planned Parenthood v. Casey. 
505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
53. Lochner v. New York. 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. striking down New York State's maximum 10-hour day for 
bakers. on the theory that the regulation impermissibly deprived both employees and 
employers of the "liberty of contract" without due process of law). 
54. See e.g. ROBERT H. BORK. THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL 
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW ( 1990). at 44. 
55. See supra note 48. Cf, Meyer v. Nebraska. 262 U.S. 390. 399 (1923) (relying on 
Lochner; recognizing familial. contractual. and other unenumerated rights of substantive 
due process); Louise Weinberg. Of Sovereignty and Union: The Leg~ends of Alden. 76 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1113. 1130 n.77 (2001) (arguing that Lochner was correct about 
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This kind of political sparring over substantive due process 
was not a significant feature of constitutional theory in the 1860s 
or in the antebellum period. Even if we could, or would. strip the 
Due Process Clause of all substantive meaning today. we cannot 
say that most antebellum lawyers who thought Dred Scott a bad 
thing, thought it a bad thing because of its substantive due proc-
ess reasoning. Neither Justice Curtis nor Justice McLean, dis-
senting in Dred Scott, had any quarrel with Taney's substantive 
due process theory as such, respectively arguing only that no due 
process deprivation occurs when property is transported to a 
place at which such property is not recognized in law.'" 
Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that the procedural 
view of the Due Process Clause would become the apparent 
view of the Chase Court in its closing days in 1873. in The 
Slaughter-House Cases.'7 The discussion of the meaning of due 
process in Slaughter-House, however. was negligible. and the 
Court did not squarely come out and say that the Clause was 
limited to procedure. It simply rejected one substantive due 
process reading on the facts of that case. Moreover, three of Lin-
coln's Justices dissented in Slaughter-House, and each agreed 
with a "'fundamental rights" theory of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, although, concededly, they relied on the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause rather than the Due Process Clause."' But it 
seems unlikely, on the evidence of Slaughter-House, that our 
an individual right to contract. certainly as to one's labor. as the Thirteenth Amendment 
makes clear: adding that the fault of Lochner lay in its fatuity in not understanding the 
effect on a contract of unequal bargaining power). See to similar effect. LAURE1'CE 
TRIBE. AMERICA:-/ CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d ed .. 2000). at 1371 (faulting Lochner for 
insensitivity to unequal bargaining power: stopping short of recognizing the positive con-
stitutional value of .. libertv of contract .. ). 
56. Dred Scou. 60 U.S. at 533-34 (McLean. 1.. dissenting): id. at 626-27 (Curtis. 1.. 
dissenting): Balkin & Levinson. Thirteen Ways. supra note 48. 
) 1 The Slaughter-House Cases. 83 U.S. ( 16 Wall.) ( 1873) (holding that the refer-
ence to .. citizens of the United States .. in the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is fatal to applying that Clause to the civil rights of citizens of a 
state: that civil rights must remain the province of the state because the Fourteenth 
Amendment could not have been intended to reverse settled understandings of the re-
spective powers of the states and nation over civil rights within a state: ;nd that the 
Equal Protection Clause is largely limited to claims by black persons.) 
58. The three Lincoln appointees dissenting in Slaughter-House were Chief Justice 
Chase and Justices Swayne and Field. Chase and Swayne joined Field's dissent. Chase 
was too ill to submit a separate opinion. but Swayne did so. Swayne's opinion made a 
footnote reference to Bushrod Washington's oft-cited list of Article IV privileges and 
immunities of state citizenship in Corfield v. Coryell. Slaughter-House. 83 U.S. at 128. 
Field's dissent argued that the Fourteenth Amendment extends the Article IV privileges 
and immunities of state citizenship to all United States citizens within the state as well as 
those outside the state coming into it. /d. at 95-96 (Field. J.. dissenting). Justice Bradley. 
who also dissented. was a Grant appointee. 
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idealized Chase Court would have considered overruling Dred 
Scott on a ''procedure only'' reading of the Fifth Amendment's 
Due Process Clause. This remains so even though Justice Davis 
joined Justice Miller's opinion for the Slaughter-House Court-
both of them Lincoln appointees. 
The real significance of Slaughter-House, ironically, is that it 
is responsible for today's substantive due process. After Slaugh-
ter-House's demolition of the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment as a repository of fundamental 
rights against the states, our rights against the states- the Bill of 
Rights, and our unenumerated rights-had nowhere else to go. 
Virtually all of our constitutional rights against state and local 
government have had to be lodged in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause. But for Slaughter-House, all of our 
fundamental rights as against the states would be comfortably 
ensconced in the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. So we know in hindsight that an overruling 
of Dred Scott on grounds rejecting substantive due process could 
not have been built on any lasting foundation. The very longev-
ity of Slaughter-House's hollow Privileges and Immunities 
Clause renders substantive due process a practical necessity, if 
the enumerated rights. or any other fundamental rights, are to 
be protected against abridgement by local government. 
In our time. certainly, it is too late to impute a thorough-
going illegitimacy to substantive due process. The Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment now "incorporates" vir-
tually every substantive right in the Bill of Rights.59 Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, in his day, attempted with incomplete success to con-
fine the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
procedural faults only, when a bare deprivation is alleged.60 But 
he did not attempt to do so when an incorporated substantive 
59. Two enumerated procedural rights remain ··unincorporated""-the Fifth 
Amendment right to indictment by grand jury. and the Seventh Amendment right to civil 
trial by jury. The substantive Second Amendment '"right to keep and bear Arms•· re-
mains unincorporated as well. as does the Third Amendment right. now in desuetude. 
against quartering of soldiers. Acknowledged unenumerated rights are equally operative 
under the Due Process Clauses of either the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments. 
60. Compare. e.g .. Zinermon v. Burch. 494 U.S. 113 (1990) (holding. over a dissent 
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist. that procedural due process was not accorded. where 
the plaintiff had been involuntarily committed to a mental institution without a pre-
commitment hearing as required by local law. notwithstanding the availability of a post-
depnvatwn remedy in tort). with Daniels v. Williams. 474 U.S. 327 (1986) (Rehnquist. 
C.J.) (holdmg that when government negligence may be remedied by a post-occurrence 
actwn m tort. the tort is not a violation of the Due Process Clause). 
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right was at issue, or even when an implied "fundamental right" 
was at issue,01 as in cases under Roe v. Wade. 
Dred Scott was and remains our worst case, not because 
Chief Justice Taney's substantive due process reasoning was 
oxymoronic, but because Dred Scott stripped Congress of power. 
laying the country open to slavery and preventing Congress from 
doing anything about it-preventing Congress from compromis-
ing the dispute that was drawing the country into the catastrophe 
of civil war. A critique of substantive due process could hardly 
do the whole job of overruling Dred Scott. A Court seeking to 
overrule Dred Scott would need to confront Dred Scott's Fifth 
Amendment with much heavier guns. 
V. ANOTHER THEORY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
MEANING OF ''PROPERTY" 
A better basis for an overruling of Dred Scott might have 
been presented by a redefinition of the word "property" in the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Of course, the Su-
preme Court could not bind the states to its view of property as a 
matter of state law. Even in those days when the Court generally 
was not bound to follow state case law where it applied,62 the 
states were certainly not bound to follow the Supreme Court's 
lead as to matters of state law.63 But the Court could authorita-
tively redefine ''property" as that word is used in the Fifth 
Amendment. 
In his 1858 debates with Douglas, Lincoln said that Chief 
Justice Taney's essential mistake of constitutional interpretation 
in Dred Scott lay in the assertion that "the right of property in a 
slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution."64 
61. Cf. Daniels. 474 U.S. at 336 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (pointing 
out that there are three different kinds of Fourteenth Amendment due process: First, 
"incorporating" rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights: second, incorporating unenu-
merated rights and rights to be free of arbitrary law; and, third, protecting under the bare 
Due Process Clause rights to fair procedures). 
62. Cf. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842). overruled. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 
u.s. 64 (1938). 
63. Erie, 304 U.S. at 74 (Brandeis. J.) (noting the persistence of state courts in ap-
plying their own laws on questions of common law). Brandeis's observation points up the 
fact that the common law available in federal courts under Swift had never been federal-
ized, and thus was not the "supreme" law of the land. It simply represented an independ· 
ent judgment of what state law ought to be, and as such was not binding on the state 
judges. 
64. Abraham Lincoln. Reply in the Galesburg Joint Debate (Oct. 7. 1858), in I 
COMPLETE WORKS. supra note 22. at 437. 445. 
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Lincoln firmly contradicted any such assertion as ''not true in 
fact. "65 A strong Lincoln Court might well reinterpret the mean-
ing of the word "property" in the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment. There is a brief passage in Aves' Cas eM that 
suggests the possibility of such a reinterpretation. Aves' Case is a 
celebrated Massachusetts opinion by Chief Justice Shaw, influ-
ential for the seminal distinction it drew, crucial to antebellum 
thought, between fugitives escaping from slave territory and 
slaves voluntarily brought into free territory. Fugitives were to 
be rendered up to their masters under the Fugitive Slave 
Clause" -part of the sacred constitutional bargain."" Even slaves 
brought voluntarily into a free state were to be rendered up, if 
they were only in transit there. But those brought voluntarily 
into a free state, sojourning there for a period of time, were not 
within the terms of the sacred bargain. "Sojourners'' could be-
come free."" In the course of discovering this distinction, through 
a prolonged struggle, Chief Justice Shaw briefly, in passing, sug-
gested the more fundamental point that there could be no prop-
erty in human beings. Here is Lemuel Shaw wrestling with this 
insight: 
But it is not speaking with strict accuracy to say, that a prop-
erty can be acquired in human beings, by local laws. Each 
state may, for its own convenience, declare that slaves shall be 
deemed property, and that the relations and laws of personal 
chattels shall be deemed to apply to them; as, for instance, 
that they may be bought and sold, delivered, attached, levied 
65. /d. at 446. 
66. Commonwealth v. Aves, 35 Mass. 193, 219 (1836) (Shaw, C.J.). See LEONARD 
W. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW (1957), at 84. 
67. U.S. CONST. art. 4, § 2, cl. 3. See Paul Finkelman, Legal Ethics and Fugitive Slaves: 
The Anthony Burns Case, Judge Loring, and Abolitionist Attorneys, 17 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1793 (1997); Louise Weinberg, Methodological Interventions and the Slavery Cases: 
Night-Thoughts of a Legal Realist, 56 MD. L. REV. 1316, 1342-59 (1997) (recounting the 
struggle in the courts over fugitive slaves). 
68. It is sometimes remarked that the South would never have joined the Union 
had not the Constitution embodied a sacred bargain guaranteeing Southern state signa-
tories' rights to their existing labor systems. The Fugitive Slave Clause was a prominent 
feature of the sacred bargain. Interestingly, at least one Northern judge reasoned. to the 
contrary, that the North would not have signed the Constitution had it imagined that it 
could be invaded by bounty hunters. and its own free black citizens kidnapped and sent 
into chattel slavery. In re Booth. 3 Wis. 13. 72 (1854) (Crawford. J.. dissenting). 
69. For the antebellum interstate conflict over the freedom vel non of non-fugitive 
slaves, see Louise Weinberg, Of Theory and Theodicy: The Problem of Immoral Law, in 
LAW AND JUSTICE IN A MULTISTATE WORLD (Symeon Symeonides ed., 2002), at 473-99; 
PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY. FEDERALISM. AND COMITY 
(1981); ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTI-SLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL 
PROCESS (1975); Weinberg, Methodological Interventions, supra note 67. at 1316. 
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upon, that trespass will lie for an injury done to them. or tro-
ver for converting them. But it would be a perversion of terms 
to say, that such local laws do in fact make them personal 
70 property generally .... 
A similar uneasiness with the chattel aspect of slavery is 
echoed, also in passing, in Salmon P. Chase's brief in the Birney 
case in Ohio.7 ' Chase wrote, "I maintain that the relation of 
owner and property, as existing between person and person, has. 
or can have, no existence in this state ...... 
On some such thinking, a Lincoln Supreme Court might 
overrule Dred Scott- by redefining the category of "property'' 
as incapable of attaching to human beings for purposes of the 
Due Process Clause. The question was raised in argument in 
Dred Scott.n Yet in Dred Scott, only Justice McLean, dissenting, 
seems to have had a doubt about property in human chattel, and 
he expressed this quite casually, without developing the argu-
ment: "But we know as a historical fact, that James Madison. 
that great and good man, a leading member in the Federal Con-
vention, was solicitous to guard the language of that instrument 
so as not to convey the idea that there could be property in 
man. 
~, 7~ 
True, the Founders owned slaves themselves. a fact on 
which Chief Justice Taney relied in Dred Scott. Taney suggested 
that the Founders could not, without hypocrisy, own slaves while 
thinking it wrong.74 Dred Scott's originalism on this point is 
among Taney's least edifying tropes. Justice McLean, dissenting, 
responded, 
I prefer the lights of Madison, Hamilton, and Jay, as a means 
of construing the Constitution in all its bearings, rather than 
to look behind that period, into a traffic which is now de-
clared to be piracy, and punished with death by Christian na-
tions. I do not like to draw the sources of our domestic rela-
tions from so dark a ground. 7' 
Chief Justice Taney's kind of originalism would fasten upon 
us the sins of the fathers, stripping them, and with them the Con-
70. Aves' Case. 35 Mass. at 216. 
71. Birney v. State. 8 Ohio 230.231 (1837) (brief of Salmon P. Chase). 
72. Dred Scott. 60 U.S. at 451 ("[l]t seems. however. to be supposed. that there is a 
difference between property in a slave and other property. and that different rules may 
be applied to it in expounding the Constitution of the United States .... "). 
73. Dred Scott. 60 U.S. at 537. 
74. /d. at 410. 
75. /d. at 537. 
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stitution, of their ideals and aspirations. It would take from us 
that legacy. A Lincoln appointee might prefer to gauge the 
Framers' aspirations from the Declaration of Independence, as 
Lincoln liked to do, rather than from the exigent compromises to 
which the Framers submitted in Philadelphia in 1787. But a Lin-
coln Court could not pretend that the Constitution did not rec-
ognize slavery, even though, as Lincoln argued at Cooper Union, 
the Constitution did not "expressly" affirm slavery.7" The Consti-
tution does not establish property in slaves, but it variously rec-
ognizes the existence of slavery and makes accommodations to 
slavery. Paul Finkelman has discussed these at length in various 
of his writings.77 Slaves were to count as fractions of persons for 
the purposes of both taxation and representation.7x Fugitive 
slaves were to be returned.74 The slave trade was not to be pro-
hibited before 1808.80 It also seems relevant that the Senate con-
sists of two representatives from each state, large or small, with-
out possibility of amendment,'1 an arrangement enabling a 
Southern majority to block an appointment to the federal judici-
ary. Furthermore, the supermajorities that the logic of the Con-
stitution required for the amendment processx2 ensured that the 
South would enjoy a permanent veto over proposed amend-
ments to the Constitution. While neither provision was merely 
an obeisance to the concerns of the slave South, Southern dele-
gates to the Constitutional Convention could return to the South 
claiming them as victories. 
In providing that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property without due process of law, the Fifth Amendment is 
understood to mean at a minimum that before federal authori-
ties can execute, imprison, or fine anyone, before a federal court 
can impose a sentence or assess damages or issue an injunction, 
due process first requires notice, trial, and judgment. And in 
76. Cf Lincoln. Address at Cooper Union. New York (Feb. 27. 1860). in I 
COMPLETE WORKS. supra note 22. at 599. 
77. See, e.g .. PAUL FINKELMAN. SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS. RACE AND 
LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF JEFFERSON (2d ed .. 2001 ). 
78. U.S. CONST. art. I.§ 2. cl. 3. ("Representatives and direct Taxes shall be appor-
tioned among the several States which may be included within this Union. according to 
their respective Numbers. which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of 
free Persons. including those bound to Service for a Term of Years. and excluding Indi-
ans not taxed. three fifths of all other Persons."). 
79. U.S. CONST. art. IV.§ 2. cl. 3. 
80. U.S. CONST. art. I.§ 9. cl. I. 
81. U.S. CONST. art I. § 3 (providing for equal state representation in the Senate): 
art. V (providing for constitutional amendments. except that "no State. without its Con-
sent. shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate."). 
82. U.S. CONST. art. V. 
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1860 it is fair to say not only that most Americans, North and 
South, would have thought the Due Process Clause to be purely 
''procedural" in this sense, but also that most Americans, North 
and South, would have understood the "property'' protected by 
the Clause to include slave property. Many today still believe 
that it did. Recently David Currie, for example, has termed 
"fatuous" the argument in the 37th Congress, as it prepared to 
abolish slavery in the capital, that there could be no property in 
human beings, because that argument was "contradicted by dec-
ades of history in the District of Columbia and centuries of it 
elsewhere.""' 
Southerners took the argument further. They also argued 
that the Fifth Amendment protected slave-owners' "liberty" as 
well as their "property." This was a liberty to take their slaves 
with them into the territories, free of federal interference. They 
sometimes argued that the concesrt of ''due process" included 
the concept of ''equality" as well. In this view, due process re-
quired the nation to give equal respect to Southern as to North-
ern property rights, to slave as to other property, and to South-
erners' as well as Northerners' rights to travel to, or settle in, a 
United States territory-with their "property." As Chief Justice 
Taney put this in Dred Scott, 
And if the Constitution recognizes the right of property of the 
master in a slave, and makes no distinction between that de-
scription of property and other property owned by a citizen, 
no tribunal, acting under the authority of the United States, 
whether it be legislative, executive, or judicial, has a right to 
draw such a distinction, or deny to it the benefit of the provi-
sions and guarantees which have been provided for the pro-
tection of private property against the encroachments of the 
Government.85 
Actually, if there is such a right it is very qualified. There is 
no Fifth Amendment right, or any other right, to take property 
83. Currie, The Civil War Congress, supra note 24. at 1149. 
84. Cf. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (holding that the Fifth Amendment's 
Due Process Clause incorporates the concept of "equal protection" as found in the Four-
teenth Amendment). The notion that due process requires evenhandedness, of course, is 
very old. 
85. Dred Scott. 60 U.S. at 451. See Democratic [Breckinridge Faction] Platform, 
para. 1, in NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, supra note 28, at 31 ("[T]he Government of a 
Territory organized by an act of Congress is provisional and temporary, and during its 
existence all citizens of the United States have an equal right to settle with their property 
in the Territory. without their rights, either of person or property. being destroyed or 
impaired by Congressional or Territorial legislation."). 
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of any kind into a territory or even a state. absolutely free of 
federal interference. The nation rather obviously must have the 
power, whenever the national interest so requires, to confiscate 
suspect articles of property anywhere in the country- in these 
security-conscious times a feature of life annoying to every fre-
quent flier. Congress possesses the national powers, whatever 
they may be, everywhere in the nation, as well as on land within 
its exclusive control, like the territories, or Washington, D.C., or 
a post office. The power of Congress is clearer in the territories, 
where it is unconstrained by considerations of federalism, and 
clearest in the capital, where the Constitution uses its strongest 
terms of legislative power.s" Congress is the local as well as the 
national legislature for the territories of the United States,"7 al-
though it may provide for a separate local territorial legislature. 
And Congress can certainly require the confiscation of contra-
band found in a territory organized under the laws of the United 
States. Chief Justice Taney's supposed unabridgeable right to 
take one's property into United States territory is and was 
imaginary. 
One can expect to see this most easily, of course, in situa-
tions in which national power is at its maximum. Although war-
time abolition in the District of Columbia was with modest 
"compensation,""' the national power physically and completely 
to confiscate slave property, anywhere, as well as to prohibit 
slavery in the territories, seems to have been well understood, at 
least as a power of the military in the Civil War period. Consider 
that Union commanders, after first punctiliously sending run-
away slaves back to their plantations and farms, began, under 
the influence of the Confiscation Acts,89 to designate runaway 
slaves as "contraband." Slaves were walking away from slavery 
wherever Union armies appeared, and could not be shooed away 
as they doggedly trudged along in the rear. The designation of 
slaves as "contraband of war" legitimized the army's "confisca-
tion" of slave "property." 
But it is also true that national power over property is al-
ways exercised in the teeth of American respect for property. 
Private property has always had a sacrosanct quality in this 
86. U.S. CONST. art. I. §8. cl. 17. 
87. Amer. Ins. Co. v. Canter. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828) (Marshall, C.J.). 
88. Act of Apr. 16, 1862. ch. 54. 12 Stat. 376 (abolishing slavery in the District of 
Columbia. setting the rate of compensation at $300.00 per slave). 
89. See Confiscation Acts. supra note 2; SILVANA R. SiDDALl. FROM PROPERTY TO 
PERSON: SLAVERY Al'OD THE CONFISCATION ACTS 1861-1862 (2005), at 37-54. 
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country. Typically, private property is protected by state law, 
and. as Chief Justice Taney pointed out in Dred Scott, it is pro-
tected from arbitrary forfeiture to the national government. 
Property in slaves was specifically a matter for state governance, 
as affirmed in 1850 in Chief Justice Taney's opinion in the case 
of Strader v. Graham.90 Reading quotidian antebellum cases, we 
are confronted with an overwhelming universal respect for rights 
in property. Property rights could stand in the way of slaves' pe-
titions for freedom in Northern courts as well as Southern.91 
Justice McLean, dissenting in Dred Scott, was constrained to 
acknowledge the deference due to the-spurious, as we know-
right to travel unimpeded with one's property. "It is said the 
Territories are common property of the States," McLean wrote, 
"and that every man has a right to go there with his property. 
This is not controverted.''92 A substantial unwarranted conces-
sion lies in those few words. 
Of course even if our hypothetical Supreme Court were to 
reinterpret the word "property" in the Fifth Amendment so as 
not to include property in persons, this could not free the slaves. 
At best, by its example such a reinterpretation could discourage 
state laws and customs, North and South. embodying the con-
cept of chattel slavery. Such a ruling would revive the power of 
judges to free ''sojourners" in territory in which Congress had 
abolished slavery, because it would have revived the power of 
Congress to create free territory. The immediate effect in law of 
overruling Dred Scott on this ground would be to restore Con-
gress's power to prohibit slavery in the territories, and thus to 
revive "compromise" legislation deligitimized by Dred Scott. It 
might seem especially important that overruling Dred Scott on 
this ground would re-empower Congress to reach some fresh 
compromise of the territories issue. But in our hypothetical 
1860s, as in 1860 actually, the South would not have stood for a 
new prohibition of slavery anywhere, and would have had suffi-
cient Democratic strength in the Senate to block any such new 
compromise.93 Any difference it might have made, in our hypo-
thetical, that the South would no longer be buoyed by Dred 
90. 51 U.S. 82 (1850) (Taney. C.J.) (holding no federal question raised by a judg-
ment determining slave status vel non: that is exclusively a question of state law). 
91. See. e.g .. In re Williams. 29 F. Cas. 1334. 1341 (E.D. Pa. 1839) (noting the clash 
between the claims of humanity and the claims of property: ultimately ruling against ren-
dition of the alleged fugitive slave). 
92. Dred Scolt. 60 U.S. at 549. 
93. For the tally in the lame duck 36th Congress. see supra note 24. 
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Scott, would seem to be cancelled by the likelihood that the 
South would have been inflamed by Dred Scott's overrule. Nor 
in our hypothetical can we blame the South exclusively for the 
likely impasse. In the past, as we have seen, the power to pro-
hibit slavery was a power Congress was habitually too riven by 
faction to exercise except, at best, in some territory, and in "bal-
anced" fashion, in some legislated "compromise" which would 
tacitly permit slavery in some other territory. In December 1860, 
however, the presidency was in the hands of Abraham Lincoln, a 
man adamantly opposed to the expansion of slavery into the ter-
ritories. The enactment of some new "compromise," allowing 
slavery in some territory as the customary quid pro quo for pro-
hibiting it elsewhere, was simply not on the cards. 
VI. BETTER THEORY: IF SLA YES WERE "PERSONS'' 
We have been looking at the constitutional concept of 
"property." We have seen that, should our hypothetical Su-
preme Court overrule Dred Scott by construing the Fifth 
Amendment word "property'' so as not to include slaves, the 
consequence would simply be to restore the status quo ante, as 
far as the power of Congress is concerned. In so doing, it would 
restore the existing "compromises," and so indirectly restore dis-
cretion to courts to free "sojourners" in territory Congress had 
designated as free. From the evidence of the Dred Scott litigation 
itself, however, Southern courts would be much less willing than 
formerly to free sojourners in any event.~4 What if slaves were to 
be considered "persons" for purposes of the Due Process 
Clause? What would be the constitutional consequences of that? 
I raise this as a separate question because it permits me to sort 
out the arguments specifically pertaining to it. 
We have seen that there was some feeling. at least. among 
antebellum lawyers and judges, that the concept of "property" 
ought not, might not, and possibly could not, include human be-
ings. Starting from an assumption that there can be no ''prop-
erty" in human beings-a self-evident proposition with us, how-
ever shaky with lawyers then- there emerges a seemingly 
obvious solution to the problem of finding apparently strong 
constitutional theory for an overruling of Dred Scott. This solu-
tion, at least to a modern imagination, might seem no more 
strained than Chief Justice Taney's analogous position in Dred 
94. See Scott v. Emerson. supra note 39. 
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Scott. But. for reasons that will appear-and these are serious 
reasons-this solution seems not to have commended itself to 
lawyers and judges at the time. For some. it seems simply not to 
have been perceived. When ventured, it seems not to have been 
developed in any thoughtful way beyond its mere assertion. 
The solution. if it was one, was hiding in plain sight. "'In 
plain sight,'' because political actors adverted to it, as obvious 
constitutional interpretation, in major statements of principle. 
"Hiding," because it seems not to have been thought through or 
developed in any sustained way or relied on with any confi-
dence. It does not seem to have been taken up and discussed 
much, either in courts or at large. As the basis of a strong attack 
on Dred Scott it might have seemed doubtful, hardly serious, un-
sound, an ultimately unconvincing way of looking at the consti-
tutional problem. At a deeper level. the difficulties accompany-
ing any such purported solution might well have seemed 
insurmountable. 
Simply put, the proposed solution would count slaves as 
"persons" for Fifth Amendment purposes. At least in our own 
thinking, that slaves are "persons" seems a much more natural 
reading of the Fifth Amendment of 1791 than Chief Justice 
Taney's. It rests in part on strong textual and contextual founda-
tions in the Constitution of 1789. Slaves are nowhere accounted 
in the Constitution as "property,'' but rather, are designated eve-
rywhere as "persons." The Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment could not be read as protecting "property" in 
slaves, if it was to be read consistently with the uniform constitu-
tional usage of "'persons." The Constitution repeatedly makes 
explicit this fundamental understanding of slaves exclusively as 
"persons." Slaves appear as "Persons" in the Three Fifths 
Clause, providing that for purposes, on the one hand, of repre-
sentation of population in the House, and, on the other, for ap-
portionment of taxes based on population, only three-fifths of 
such "Persons,'' including those "bound to labor,'' were to be 
counted.9; This usage of "Persons" then reappears in the clause 
denying Congress power to prohibit the slave trade before 
1808.90 And it is "'Persons" who are the object of the Fugitive 
95. U.S. CO!'IST. art. I.§ 2. cl. 3. ("Representatives and direct Taxes shall be appor-
tioned among the several States which may be included within this Union. according to 
their respective Numbers. which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of 
free Persons. including those bound to Service for a Term of Years. and excluding Indi-
ans not taxed. three fifths of all other Persons."). 
96. U.S. CONST. art I. § 9. cl. 1 ("The Migration or Importation of such Persons as 
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Slave Clause,y7 requiring the delivering up of a runaway slave 
upon the claim of the master (not designated as the "owner").YH 
This usage of personhood does not vary. Nowhere in the 
Constitution are slaves designated as "property." Nowhere in 
the Constitution are slaves designated as slaves. Slavery is nei-
ther mentioned in the Constitution of 1789 nor the Bill of Rights 
of 1791. The Constitution uses fastidious circumlocutions in-
stead. Since, under the Constitution, slaves were always "per-
sons," and never ''property," it would seem more natural in 
reading the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution to adopt this 
emphatic constitutional usage, which it was never supposed to 
have been an intention of the Bill of Rights to undo. In this more 
natural reading of the Fifth Amendment, slaves would remain 
the same "persons" they are in the Constitution. In view of this 
striking textual usage, Chief Justice Taney's reading of the con-
stitutional texts begins to seem not only ungrounded but per-
verse, if only on textual grounds. (As Taney could not know, the 
word "slavery" first appears in the Constitution in 1865, with the 
Thirteenth Amendment, abolishing it.9Y) 
If it can be agreed that, under the Fifth Amendment of 
1791, slaves must be accounted "persons," just as they were per-
sons under the Constitution of 1789, then the Due Process 
Clause kicks in on their behalf, and slaves become persons whom 
the nation may not, without due process of law, deprive of their 
lives, their liberty, or their property-in this context, property in 
the fruits of their own labor. And this right to their own lives, 
liberty and labor is theirs, at least as against federal interference, 
notwithstanding the absence, in our hypothetical, of the Thir-
teenth Amendment. Caveat: In asserting this I am eliding a good 
many tough questions. But it is necessary to state the proposition 
before dealing with its deficiencies, serious as those deficiencies 
may be. 
any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit. shall not be prohibited by the 
Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight. but a Tax or duty may 
be imposed on such Importation. not exceeding ten dollars for each Person."). 
97. U.S. CONST. art. IV. § 2. cl. 3 ("No Person held to Service or Labour in one 
State. under the Laws thereof. escaping into another. shall. in Consequence of any Law 
or Regulation therein. be discharged from such Service or Labour. but shall be delivered 
up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due."). 
98. It is of some interest that the Fugitive Slave Clause contains no language em-
powering Congress to enforce it. although Article IV. Clause I. gave Congress power to 
legislate for effectuation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 
99. "Neither slaverv nor involuntary servitude ... shall exist within the United 
States. or any place subje~t to their jurisdi~tion." U.S. CaNST. amend. XIII.§ 1 (1865). 
760 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 24:733 
It is hard to imagine disagreement today with the casting of 
slaves as "persons." We have the Reconstruction Amendments, 
and the civil rights laws. Besides, our moral views have 
improved. However, we can reasonably suppose, with more than 
mere presentism, that if this reinterpretation of the Fifth 
Amendment is sound today, it would at least have had some 
force then, given the great weight of anti-slavery feeling in the 
country, not only in 1860 but at the time of the Founding. 
One fact concerning the history of the Due Process Clause 
stands out. From the beginning, when first proposed by James 
Madison in the House on June 8, 1789, through all the drafts and 
debates on the Bill of Rights, the language of the Due Process 
Clause, its language of "persons," "deprivation,'' "life", "lib-
erty," and ''property," remained substantially the same.HxJ The 
1789 draft of the Fifth Amendment, as first proposed, read, in 
pertinent part, ''No person shall ... be deprived of his life, lib-
erty. or property, without due process of law."101 There was no 
discussion of this wording in either the House or Senate. I do not 
find intelligible debate on the meaning of either the word "prop-
erty'' or the word "person.'' 
The likeliest explanation of the easy acceptance of the Due 
Process Clause in the draft of 1789, notwithstanding the preva-
lence of slavery over much of the young country, is that the 
words were already traditional boilerplate. The Due Process 
Clause probably would have conveyed to an observer at the time 
no more than a traditional expression of the fundamental right 
of Englishmen, or free men, to trial before punishment, accord-
ing to the law of the land. Consider that a similar calm reception. 
notwithstanding slavery, was accorded the language of the Dec-
laration of Independence, that "all men are created equal." Yet 
~y the 185~s. anti-slavery _l~aders were r~.~ying on the Declara-
tlon as calhng for the abohtwn of slavery. - Just as cultural con-
tradiction forced a change in meaning, over time, in the case of 
!00. THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS (Neil H. Cogan ed .. !997). at 265-94; see also 
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS (Helen E. Veil eta!. eds .. 1991). 
101. I CONG. REC. (Jun. 8. 1789). at 315. 
102. For his part. Lincoln liked to rely on the Declaration of Independence. with its 
proclamation that all men are created equal. Lincoln would say at Gettysburg that Amer-
ica was dedicated at its birth to that proposition. Speech at Gettysburg, Pennsylvama 
(Nov. 19. 1863). in II COMPLETE WORKS. supra note 22. at 439; see generally GEORGE P. 
FLETCHER. "NOR LONG REMEMBER:" OUR SECRET CONSTITUTION: HOW LiNCOLN 
REDEFINED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2001): GARY WILLS. LiNCOLN AT GETTYSBURG: 
THE WORDS THAT REMADE AMERICA (1982). 
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the Declaration, so also it could have done in the case of the 
Due Process Clause. 
It may come as a shock to some readers that a radical rein-
terpretation of the Fifth Amendment along the lines described 
was in fact already quite apparent in the antebellum period.103 In 
the 1840s there emerged a new political party, the Liberty 
Party/'J.l a precursor of the Republican Party of the mid-1850s. 
The chief aims of the Liberty Party were to defeat the main-
stream big political coalitions, the Whig and Democratic parties, 
and to delegitimize the statutory "compromises" of the past, 
which had been engineered by leaders of those parties, since all 
of the old compromises had authorized slavery to some extent. 
In the Liberty Party's platforms we find an unambiguous reading 
of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment as protecting 
the life. liberty, and property of persons from national authoriza-
tion of their enslavement. You see this reading in one of the ear-
liest of all party platforms, the Liberty Party's platform of 1844. 
A plank in this platform resolves that ''the fundamental truths of 
the Declaration of Independence, that all men are endowed by 
their Creator with certain inalienable rights, among which are 
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, was [sic] made the fun-
damental law of our National Government, by that amendment 
of the constitution which declares that no persons shall be de-
prived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law." 105 
Thus the Liberty Party was already making a substantive due 
process argument long before Chief Justice Taney did so in Dred 
Scott- but one working in precisely the opposite direction. 
The successor to the Liberty Party, the Free Soil Party, was 
more overtly concerned with protecting the work and wages of 
white labor from slave competition. 1110 The Free Sailers also lim-
ited the scope of their argument to the territories. They argued 
that. while the Constitution might preserve and protect slavery 
in the slave states, the Fifth Amendment's protection of personal 
liberty as against the nation disempowered Congress from per-
mitting slavery in any place under the nation's exclusive control. 
103. See Robert R. Russel. Constillltional Doctrines with Regard to Slavery in the 
Terri wries. 32 J. So. HI ST. 466 ( 1966). 
104. Liberty Party Platform. Campaign of 1844. in NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS. 
supra note 28. at 4. The Liberty Party drew its anti-slavery membership from the so-
called ··Barn burner Democrats .. and .. Conscience Whigs ... /d. at 10. 
I 05. Liberty Party Platform of 1844. para. 9. in NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS .. HI-
pra note 28. at 5. 
106. See ERIC FONER. FREE SOIL. FREE LABOR. FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF 
THE REPL'BLIC A:\ PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR ( 1970). 
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In their view, because of the exclusivity of national control over 
the territories, the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause pro-
tected slaves as "persons" from Congressional deprivation of 
their liberty in the territories. In the 1848 campaign, the Free 
Sailers adopted a platform declaring that "our fathers ... ex-
pressly denied to the Federal Government, which they created, 
all constitutional power to deprive an~ person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due legal process."10 
In the campaign of 1852, this Party, significantly enlarged, 
called itself the Free Democratic Party. Its platform reiterated 
that ·'the Constitution of the United States, ... expressly denies 
to the General Government all power to deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... "108 
The Free Sailers transformed themselves once more in the 
campaign of 1856 into the American Party, or the "Know-
Nothings."]()') They adopted nativist anti-immigration and anti-
Catholic policies. These policies were prompted for the most 
part by the same concern that prompted their anti-slavery policy: 
the maintenance of work and wages for existing American free 
labor. 
The new Republican Party was an outgrowth and coming 
together of all of these essentially Northern Whig parties. In the 
first Republican Party platform, in 1856, we see the same sub-
stantive interpretation of the Due Process Clause: 
[Resolved,] That . . . as our Republican fathers, when they 
had abolished Slavery in all our national territory, ordained 
that 'no person should be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law,' it becomes our duty, by legisla-
tion, whenever such legislation is necessary, to maintain this 
provision of the Constitution against all attempts to violate it; 
and we deny the authority of Congress, of a territoriallegisla-
107. Free Soil Party Platform of 1848, fourth resolution. in NATIONAL PARTY 
PLATFORMS. supra note 28, at 13. 
108. Free Democratic Platform of 1852, para. IV. in NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, 
supra note 28. at 18. 
109. The term "Know-Nothings" is said to have originated in the secret club that 
became a nucleus of the party of that name. The club was reputed to have directed its 
members. when asked about it. to say. ··I know nothing ... See Michael F. Holt, The Anti-
masonic and Know Nothing Parties. in I HISTORY OF UNITED STATES POLITICAL 
PARTIES (Arthur Schlesinger. Jr. ed .. 1973). at 575-620: but see TYLER ANBINDER. 
NATIVISM AND SLAVERY: THE NORTHERN KNOW NOTHINGS AND THE POLITICS OF 
THE 1850s (1992) (not offering this hypothesis). 
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ture, or of any individuals. to give !epa! existence to Slavery in 
any Territory of the United States. w 
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In 1860 Lincoln ran on a Republican platform forcefully re-
iterating the applicability of the Due Process Clause to persons 
enslaved, at least in the territories, in language substantially 
identical to that of the 1856 campaign. 111 
Here, then, is stronger constitutional theory that at first 
blush well might undergird a case-a case not declaring slavery 
unconstitutional, but declaring Congress powerless to enable it. 
The theory that seems to have evaded antebellum anti-slavery 
lawyers and judges had been available, apparently, all along. The 
means of attacking Dred Scott on constitutional grounds seem-
ingly lay ready to hand. 
Yet it is significant that neither Justice McLean nor Justice 
Curtis, dissenting in Dred Scott, were willing to indulge in such 
thinking. There is no argument, in either opinion, that the Fifth 
Amendment protects liberty, not slavery. If the reading of the 
Fifth Amendment proposed here would have been natural in the 
antebellum period, why did neither of the able dissenters in 
Dred Scott argue it? Why does the argument not occur in any 
developed fashion in antebellum writings? 
The likely reasons are many, and are substantial. Curiously, 
current commen~ators have s~arc~~Y addre_ssed them. Curre?t 
commentators, With few exceptiOns - have, hke commentators m 
the antebellum period, avoided raising even the possibility of the 
proposed rereading of the Due Process Clause, even if only to 
expose whatever flaws they might find in it. Yet when they do, 
they tend to make unconvincing arguments. The Takings Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment seems to have deflected some commen-
tators from the Due Process Clause, entangling them in prob-
lems of compensation or reparations. 113 Others, as we have seen, 
110. Republican Platform of 1856. Resolution 2. in NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS. 
supra note 28, at 27. 
111. Republican Platform of 1860. para. 8. in NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS. supra 
note 28. at 32. 
112. See, e.g .. Jennifer P. Arlen. Of Property Rights and the Fifth Amendment. 33 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 299.317 (1991): "The flaw in Taney's reasoning was his charac-
terization of the slaveholder as a property owner. ... Only the slaveholder's rights con-
cerned Taney. and he did not question whether Scott had been deprived of his liberty 
without due process of law." · 
113. See, e.g .. DAVID P. CL'RRIE. DESCENT INTO THE MAELSTROM: 1R29-1861 
(2005). at 13: see also Kaimipono David Wenger. Slavery as a Takings Clause Violation. 
53 AM. U. L. REV. 191.251-55 (2003). 
764 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 24:733 
become bogged down in outdated criticisms of substantive due 
process. What are the real obstacles to the proposal? 
Most obviously, the proposed revised reading of the Fifth 
Amendment might seem to place the restrictions of the 
Amendment improperly on private persons instead of upon the 
national government. If the lives, liberty, or property of slaves 
were what mattered, it was not the nation that imported, bought, 
owned, or employed slave labor, or in any other way deprived 
slaves of life, liberty, or property. It was the slave-masters who 
did. 11 ~ But the Fifth Amendment does not control private con-
duct. 
An answer to this is that, in the old compromises, Congress 
had implicitly authorized slavery. In our own understandings, of 
course, it is reasonably clear that the "governmental action" re-
quirement of constitutional review is satisfied even if govern-
ment merely enables private acts that, if public acts, would vio-
late the Constitution. In the twentieth century, the Supreme 
Court was to hold, in Reitman v. Mulkey, that government could 
not entangle itself in private discrimination, even when the chal-
lenged law authorizing private discrimination was approved by 
referendum. 115 I can recall no Reitman-like authority in the ante-
bellum period, but there would seem to have been no definite 
bar to such reasoning in a Lincoln Supreme Court in the 1860s. 
Even so, some modern writers have been perplexed by this 
class of problems, as John Hart Ely seems to have been, beguiled 
1l.t See John Hart Ely, Interc/ausa/ Immunity. 87 VA. L. REV. 1185. 1159 (2001) 
(taking the position that government could have no responsibility for slavery in a case 
challenging an enslavement. since the slave-master was the logical defendant in such a 
case. not the government). See, analogously. DeShaney v. Winnebago Dep't of Social 
Serv .. 489 U.S. 189 (1989). In that case. a local agency sent a social worker to visit an 
abused child. Joshua DeShaney. regularly. The social worker repeatedly noted the child's 
deteriorating condition. but took no action. The Court. by Chief Justice Rehnquist. ruled 
that the agency could not be held liable under the Civil Rights Act of 1871. 42 U.S.C. § 
1983. for Joshua's ultimate vegetative status requiring permanent institutionalization. 
since his father. not the agency. was the abuser. Note that the DeShaney principle does 
not apply where the plaintiff is injured while in the custody or control of government of-
ficials. Revere v. Massachusetts General HospitaL 463 U.S. 239 (1983): Youngberg v. 
Romeo. 457 U.S. 307 (1982). 
115. Reitman v. Mulkey. 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (striking down under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause an amendment to California's constitution. approved by referendum. on the 
ground that the amendment entangled the state in private discriminatory choices: the 
amendment barred the state from prohibiting anyone from refusing. within her discre-
tion. to sell. lease or rent real property to anyone): Romer v. Evans. 517 U.S. 620 (1996) 
(striking down under the Equal Protection Clause an amendment to Colorado's constitu-
tion. approved by referendum. on the ground that the amendment could be explained 
onlv bv animus to the affected class: the amendment selectively disqualified sexual pref-
ere~ce" for the protections of state civil rights law). 
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by the hypothetical case of judicial review of a particular en-
slavement. It appeared to Ely that state action would be wanting 
in such a case, since slaves are obviously deprived of their liberty 
by their masters, not by government. 11 " Professor Ely down-
played the principle of Shelley v. Kraemer, 117 limiting it to its own 
facts, and apparently not reading as relevant the mass of civil 
cases in which judicial assumptions of jurisdiction or authoriza-
tions of attachment in wholly private cases are struck down un-
der the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or 
such other wholly private cases as Times v. Sullivan, 11 H in which it 
is the action of a court that constitutes the alleged constitutional 
violation. 11 ~ 
It might be argued, with more force, that Congress could 
not. by mere exception, inaction, and tacit understanding, be 
held accountable for the establishment of slavery in territory 
which it merely exempted from abolition. Yet in a larger sense 
the tacit national permission to a territory to opt for slave status 
was never innocent. The responsibility of Congress for slavery in 
slave territories seems clear enough. No reasonably sentient 
American in 1820 could have believed that the legislated exemp-
tion from abolition for territories below the Missouri Compro-
mise line was not an authorization of slavery in those territories. 
The point of the successive "compromise" acts of Congress was 
to allow for the establishment of slave territories as the quid pro 
quo for abolition elsewhere. The Compromise of 1850 left open 
the option, however unlikely of exercise, of slavery in territory 
that would become New Mexico and Utah. The "popular sover-
eignty" of the Kansas-Nebraska Act does not escape this analy-
sis. In the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854, the very purpose of 
''popular sovereignty" was to leave open the option of slavery in 
the designated territory. Congress could not do this without re-
sponsibility in fact for facilitating the deprivation of liberty to 
individuals thereafter held as slaves under the law of that terri-
tory. Congress could not compromise away the fundamental 
rights of individuals. To whatever extent a reinterpretation of 
116. Ely. !nterc/ausa!lmmunity. supra note 114. at 1199. 
117. 334 U.S. I (1948) (holding. under the Equal Protection Clause. that state judges 
may not enforce racially restrictive covenants in actions between private parties). 
118. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (under the First Amend-
ment striking down an application of state libel law in an action by a public figure against 
a newspaper. when actual malice had not been shown). 
119. See. e.g .. Bush v. Gore. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (striking down under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause a Florida court"s order mandating a vote recount using too vague a stan-
dard). 
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the Due Process Clause that would lead us to this conclusion 
would require an imaginative leap in the 1860s, the leap ought to 
have been relatively easy for a Court whose recent predecessor 
had leapt over a natural reading of the Due Process Clause to 
produce a strained holding disabling to Congress at a time of 
great national need. Given the Republican Party's principles in 
the election of 1860, a strong Lincoln Court might well perceive 
the utter disregard in Dred Scott of the personhood, and thus the 
humanity, 120 of the enslaved population. 
What. then, would become the condition of the territories 
upon an overturning of Dred Scott on this ground? All territories 
of the United States would be free, since no act of Congress or 
its delegates, the territorial legislatures, would be constitutional, 
if it purported to allow, establish, or maintain slavery. 
I pause to note that the territories were the particular con-
cern in Dred Scott, and we need not argue that Congress should 
also be accounted ultimately responsible for slavery in the slave 
states carved out of slave territory. 121 We need not try to argue 
that an overturning of Dred Scott on the ground proposed would 
therefore liberate the slaves within those states. We do not need 
to make that case. But we can be aware that in permitting a ter-
ritory to be settled by slave-owners, Congress typically would 
have anticipated that states emerging from that territory would 
opt for slave status. And those states were understood to be 
creatures of Congress. Their legislatures, like territorial legisla-
tures, could be accounted Congress's delegates. It might not be 
too much to say that Congress was responsible in fact for depri-
vations of the liberty of persons in new slave states. The major 
argument to the contrary is that new slave states became inde-
pendent of Congress. Even if Congress was an original cause of 
slavery in a new slave state. once a state was admitted to the Un-
ion the establishment and maintenance of slavery in its own laws 
would constitute an intervening cause, and an apparently suffi-
120. Humane feelings toward the slaves were not uncommon, and were argued 
paternalistically in support of slavery. See KENNETH M. STAMPP. THE PECULIAR 
INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH (1989) (1956). at 322-30. 
121. I refer here to existing slave states that came into being after the original thir-
teen. Questions concerning future new slave states were moot as a practical matter. After 
the Compromise of 1850 it was understood that there could be no more new slave states. 
Southern hopes were focusing on the Caribbean. See H.R. Exec. Doc. No. 33-93, at 127 
(1854) ("Ostend Manifesto"] (recommending the United States to offer Spain $130 mil-
lion for Cuba. and. if spurned, to "wrest'' Cuba from Spain); see also Democratic Plat-
form of 1860 (Breckinridge Faction). in NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, supra note 28, 
at 31 (advocating in its second resolution the acquisition of Cuba). 
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cient one. And we recall that in 1850, in Strader v. Graham, the 
Supreme Court had held that the slave status of persons raised 
no federal question, but was entirely a matter of state law.122 In 
addition, the old compromises generally provided that new 
states should enter the Union on an "equal footing" with the 
original thirteen states. It was part of the intention of the "equal 
footing" clauses to insulate slavery in new slave states from con-
stitutional or legal attack. Just as the original slave states were 
embraced by the Constitution of 1789, with all its accommoda-
tions to slavery, so also would new slave states be. In this way. 
Congress tried retroactively to bestow upon new slave states not 
only the constitutional privileges accorded slave-owners, but the 
constitutional and therefore moral blessing of the Framers. But, 
as to this last point, a Lincoln Court might hold that Congress 
should not be permitted, by a verbal ingenuity in ordinary legis-
lation to create an illusion of constitutionality and extend it over 
a deprivation of liberty in fact. No clever language about "equal 
footing," the Court might reason, could bar effective judicial re-
view of what could be deemed, in effect, a governmental estab-
lishment of slavery. Yet, taken all in all, I find it too much of a 
strain to conclude that an overruling of Dred Scott could be 
stretched to turn the newer slave states into free territory. 
Returning to the problem of slavery in the territories, there 
were far more serious difficulties in the way of the proposed 
overruling of Dred Scott than I have mentioned thus far or seen 
discussed in the literature. A redefinition of slaves as Fifth 
Amendment "persons," taken for all it was worth, could up-end 
basic legal and constitutional understandings, and enmesh soci-
ety in anomalies of governance, logic, and feeling. A retroactive 
reading of the Fifth Amendment (as prohibiting Congress from 
authorizing slavery, expressly or impliedly), without more, could 
not abolish slavery nationwide. It would leave slavery intact, at a 
minimum in the original thirteen states, and probably in all 
states in which it existed. But it would void the Fugitive Slave 
Clause-once the Fifth Amendment was perceived to have 
amended that Clause-and with it, of course, the Fugitive Slave 
Act. 123 Federal courts, and indeed the Supreme Court, could not 
122. 51 U.S. 82 (1850) (Taney, C.J.). 
123. In addition, private parties could not retain the self-executing constitutional 
"right" of recaption of their fugitive slave "property" under the rule of Prigg v. Pennsyl-
vania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539. 612-13 (1842). That right required no implementation by 
Congress, but once slaves were adjudged "persons." they would presumably lose their 
status as "property," and Prigg could not stand. 
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continue to acknowledge master-slave relationships. even within 
slave states. since the Fifth Amendment controls the conduct of 
federal judges. Our reinterpretation of the Fifth Amendment 
would seem to require endowing slaves. even those within the 
slave states, with all the protections of the Bill of Rights. in any 
action concerning them, as long as that action fell within one of 
the heads of federal jurisdiction available at the time- although 
state judges would remain free to enforce slave law. 
And there would remain difficulties of logic. To suppose 
that the slaves were Fifth Amendment "persons" would have 
seemed, in the minds of most Americans, at best only a troubling 
paradox. Although the Fifth Amendment constrains only na-
tional power, a right of slaves to any liberty at all would have 
seemed incompatible with the condition of servitude. It was the 
sheer illogic of the thing. How could "slaves'' have "rights?" It 
was simply a contradiction in terms. In whatever way the Consti-
tution designated them, they were slaves, and indeed, remained 
"property'' under state law. Almost by definition. slaves could 
hardly enjoy the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights. It is 
only a partial answer to all this that the Due Process Clause pro-
tects not slaves, but persons. It is easy enough to say that an au-
thorization by Congress to permit slavery should trigger the 
Fifth Amendment, not blot it out. It is much harder to imagine a 
pre-Fourteenth Amendment world in which slaves have federal 
liberty rights but remain slaves under state law. 
The difficulties we have been describing would be erased, or 
at least set on the path of extinction, even in the absence of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, by a Supreme Court case overruling 
Barron v. Baltimore, the case in which the Court, by Chief Jus-
tice Marshall, held that the Bill of Rights limited only the nation 
and did not control state governmental acts. 124 State-law property 
rights, state-law protections of slavery, state responsibility for 
the condition of servitude, would have been addressable much 
more readily without Barron. So obvious is the desirability of 
this that our hypothetical Supreme Court might itself see the 
need. and overturn Strader as well as Barron, in the same case in 
which it overrules Dred Scott. And yet the very sweepingness of 
the desirable change is some indication of the political difficulty 
and practical peril of the project of trying to extricate the coun-
try from Dred Scott. If the Fifth Amendment became applicable 
124. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (Marshall. C.J.) (holding the Bill of Rights applicable 
only to the nation. not the states). 
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to the states, and slaves were held to be not "property" but ''per-
sons" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, we would 
have a legal regime substantially the equivalent of a Fourteenth 
Amendment in which the Bill of Rights was "incorporated." The 
upshot would be that the nation would have a clarified complete 
power of abolition of slavery even within the existing states. It 
may be somewhat soothing to the spirit vexed by the unreality of 
all this anachronistic progressiveness that we are at least describ-
ing the state of the law, more or less, that we finally do have in 
our own day. But all this would have been so revolutionary in 
Southern thinking in its time that it might have triggered the 
same secession that, in our convenient hypothetical the South 
rejects in 1861, with the same danger that secession might spill 
over to the border states. 
And then there were matters of feeling. There were psycho-
logical obstacles to the visibility of the personhood of the slaves 
or to any understanding of the constitutional import of their per-
sonhood. There was a racial presumption of slavery in the South, 
so that slavery was associated with a black skin. Many Ameri-
cans then would not have conceded to slaves, and often not even 
to black freedmen, a personhood capacious enough to have en-
dowed them with even limited membership in the American 
community. Chief Justice Taney pointed this out at dispiriting 
length in Dred Scott. 12' In those days many Americans could not, 
with the best will in the world, seriously imagine black persons 
as entitled to rights, even if it would have been logical to do so, 
and even if it were conceded on all sides that these were rights 
only against federal, not state, intrusion, and even if this latter 
arrangement were not anomalous. Rather, Chief Justice Taney's 
view, that blacks had no rights which whites were bound to re-
spect, might have seemed to many then far more natural than 
any proposition to the contrary. Especially convincing to them 
would have been Taney's outraged and incredulous cry that to 
grant blacks personhood ("citizenship," in that context,) would 
have been to grant them a right to "keep and carry arms wher-
ever they went." 12" The proposed reorientation of the Due Proc-
ess Clause, then, taken all in all, seems too problematic to be de-
veloped without great difficulty. 
At least we can say that our consideration of the proposed 
revised view of slaves as "persons" has helped us to see the es-
125. Dred Scott. 60 U.S. at 403.407-17. 
126. /d. at 416. 
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sential wrongness of Dred Scott. The case's true constitutional 
infirmity, whatever difficulties may have stood in the way of cor-
recting that infirmity, becomes much clearer to us. We can now 
see that Chief Justice Taney twisted the Due Process Clause to 
his pro-slavery purposes, closing his eyes to the Clause's full 
bearing and more natural reading. Read straightforwardly, the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment protects the free-
dom of all persons from arbitrary deprivation by the nation of 
life, liberty. or property. Slavery amounts to a more total depri-
vation of all these things-life, liberty, and property-than any 
other that can be imagined. short of death. Chief Justice Taney's 
holding in Dred Scott, then, amounted to a perversion of the bet-
ter meaning of the Due Process Clause-one that was apparent 
at the time. If a better reading of the Fifth Amendment was ut-
terly impracticable in the conditions of the time, the Dred Scott 
Court should have rested content with its jurisdictional ruling. 
VII. THE IRONIES 
Interestingly, an overruling of Dred Scott on the ground that 
the Due Process Clause protected the slaves as "persons" would, 
even apart from the anomalies and difficulties which I have 
touched upon, produce a different result from that produced by 
an overruling of Dred Scott on the related ground that slaves 
were not "property." The redefinition of "property," as we have 
seen. would strip slave-owners of federal protection in the terri-
tories, restoring the status quo ante. The redefinition of "per-
sons," however, would have the odd further effect of leaving in-
tact Dred Scott's holding that the Missouri Compromise was 
unconstitutional. 
We are thus confronted, if not with a paradox, then with a 
perplexing irony. Chief Justice Taney had been absolutely 
right-in a sense-in Dred Scott. Taney was right that the Mis-
souri Compromise of 1820 was unconstitutional. And, we must 
add, all the old statutory "compromises" had been unconstitu-
tional all along. This was not, as Taney thought, because the 
Missouri compromise limited the rights of masters to keep slave 
"property," but rather because in the Missouri Compromise (as 
in every one of those old enactments), Congress had allowed for 
slavery. In other words, Congress had tacitly but obviously au-
thorized deprivations of the lives, liberty, and property of "per-
sons." So overruling Dred Scott on our proffered ground would 
have left all the old compromises as unconstitutional as they 
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were after Dred Scott. In the end. then, Congress would remain 
as powerless under the Fifth Amendment to effect any new 
peaceful if temporising compromise as it was under Dred Scott. 
There is a further. supreme irony in all of this. Even assum-
ing the requisite judicial and political will to overrule Dred Scott, 
and even setting to one side the legal and practical difficulties 
confronting a Supreme Court desirous of doing so. overruling 
Dred Scott could not have avoided the Civil War. In overruling 
Dred Scott on the ground proposed in this essay. the Court. 
ironically. would have left Congress as powerless as Chief Justice 
Taney had left it to effect any further compromise of the sec-
tional dispute. even if the country had not. in the acute crisis of 
1860, passed the point of compromise. However importantly 
Dred Scott may be presumed to have contributed to the coming of 
the Civil War, overruling Dred Scott could not have averted it. We 
discover. in this, one of the sad ironies of the American tragedy. 
Could you and L contemplating the story of the compro-
mises of the rights of "persons," compromises formed for the 
high purpose of preserving the Union. have fallen into the same 
moral trap as those antebellum Congresses that enacted them? 
Why did we imagine, why do we still imagine. that diplomacy 
and compromise are invariably right and good. when they may 
be only expedient? How could James Madison have said that 
"no blame should attach?" To the extent that extra-
constitutional means are sometimes truly necessary, 127 we had 
the excuse of our need. The Constitution of 1789 was marred by 
the same need. Yet to the extent that the Bill of Rights reflects 
American ideals, the course of compromise with slavery was al-
ways as unconstitutional as it was wrong. 
VIII. CODA 
In the end, of course, it was not the Court, but the Four-
teenth Amendment that wrote finis to Dred Scott. It is true that 
in 1862 Congress defied Dred Scott, outlawing slavery in the ter-
ritories.12H But the constitutionality of that act of defiance would 
remain unclear as long as Dred Scott stood. It was the Four-
teenth Amendment that overrode Dred Scott, and did so in 
. 1 129 every part1cu ar. 
127. See infra note 129 on the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
128. See CURRIE. DESCENT INTO THE MAELSTROM, supra note 113, at 1149-50. 
129. Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment by Southern states was largely co-
erced. Under the first Military Reconstruction Act. Congress ejected defined Southern 
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In Dred Scott. Chief Justice Taney declared that black 
Americans could never be citizens. 1"' But the Fourteenth 
Amendment endows every person born or naturalized in Amer-
ica with the inestimable treasure of American citizenship. 131 
In Dred Scott, Chief Justice Taney asserted that the black 
man had no rights which the white man was bound to respect. 13" 
But the Fourteenth Amendment says: Here they are. Those 
rights include rights to life, liberty, and property, and no state 
may deprive you of them without due process. They include the 
privileges and immunities of United States citizenship, that no 
state may abridge. And they include the right to equal protec-
tion of the laws, which no state may deny. 133 
Dred Scott held that Congress had no power to limit the 
rights of slave-masters. 134 But the Fourteenth Amendment says 
that Congress shall have power to enforce its terms. 135 
Dred Scott relied on the view in Strader v. Graham that a 
state could choose slave status for itself.136 But the Fourteenth 
Amendment i~B?ses n_ational standards o~. the states, sayin_g, 
"No state shall. · And It made all persons Citizens of the state m 
which they reside. 13R 
In Dred Scott, Chief Justice Taney insisted that slaves were 
property. 139 But the Fourteenth Amendment rejects that delu-
sion when it provides that no compensation shall ever be paid by 
state or nation on account of the loss or emancipation of a slave, 
and that all debts and obligations on account of such loss shall be 
void. 140 
There may be other ways of reading the Fourteenth 
Amendment, but, whatever its other aims, the Fourteenth 
Amendment-and not the Supreme Court-did, finally, succeed 
in overcoming Dred. 
states and conditioned their readmission upon ratification of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Act of Mar. 2. 1867. ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428, 249 (1867). Cf. Coleman v. Miller, 307 
U.S. 433 (1939) (holding the amendment process a nonjusticiable political question). 
130. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 407. 
131. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.§ 1. 
132. 60 U.S. at 407. 
133. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.§ 1. 
134. 60 U.S. at 451. 
135. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.§ 5. 
136. 60 U.S. at 452. 
137. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.§ 1. 
138. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.§ 1. 
139. 60 U.S. at 410 & passim. 
140. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.§ 4. 
